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Academic propositions – PhD – Luca Franza 
1. The design of historical long-term contracts responded to geopolitical, economic, and commercial 
objectives. They were designed to minimise and manage conflict, distribute trade gains and cross-
border rents between Western Europe and the Soviet Union, and ensure the viability of capital-
intensive, asset-specific investment allocated in conditions of bounded rationality and uncertainty – 
in line with TCE findings. 
 
2. EU gas market liberalisation had collateral geo-economic objectives vis-à-vis Russia (cf. Lisbon 
Strategy).  
 
3. Gas oversupply at the end of the 2000s created a situation whereby EU importers were committed 
to buy expensive gas from Gazprom but had to compete with cheap spot-priced gas in the end-user 
market, which led to long-term contract renegotiations and arbitrations. 
 
4. Historical oil-indexed long-term contracts will not make a comeback, but, in line with findings from 
the contract literature, a return to more long-term contracting (albeit in different forms from the 
past) is to be expected, . 
 
5. The quantitative analysis found that the adoption of hub indexation resulted in savings for the EU, 
and an order of magnitude of such savings has been indicated (between 3.03 and 6.87 billion euros 
per year on average between 2009 and 2018). 
 
6. The focus of the EU’s foreign energy policy discourse on Russian gas is not justified on political-
economic grounds.  
 
7. Unlike import bill savings, the long-term damage to the EU-Russia gas trade relation is impossible to 
translate into quantitative variables. The impact of the deterioration in the trade relation will be felt 
more acutely by the EU when today’s buyers’ market gives way to a sellers’ market, potentially posing 
risks for the EU’s security of supply. 
 
8. By understating its future energy import needs and discouraging the signature of new long-term 
contracts, the EU is pursuing a risky security of supply strategy (or not pursuing a strategy at all).  
 
9. From a geo-economic perspective, it would mostly be oil that strengthened Russia relative to the 
West in the 2000s. The fact that transformations in EU-Russia gas trade dented Gazprom’s sales 
revenues in the EU between 2009 and 2018 was not a key development for redressing Russia’s 
increased defiance of the West, even if from a macro-economic and fiscal perspective Gazprom’s 
revenues in the EU are certainly not negligible. 
 
10. The notion that the liberalisation of EU gas markets and aspects of EU-Russia gas trade would trigger 
Russian gas market liberalisation neglects the presence of logics of appropriateness, institutional 
complementarities and path dependencies.  
 
